Pareto-Optimal

Workshops attended

At MIT/Harvard
Fall 2008
Organizational: Luis Garicano (LSE) - The Distinct Effects of Information Technologies and Communication Technologies on Firm Organization
Organizational: Julie Wulf (HBS) - The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization
Organizational: Antoinette Schoar (Sloan) - The Importance of Hold-Up in Contracting: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Organizational: Sudipto Bhattacharya (LSE) - Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes
Theory: Peter Eso (Kellogg MEDS) - Wait and See: A Theory of Communication Over Time
Theory: Tayfun Sonmez (BC) - Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
Theory: Peyton Young (Oxford) - Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
Public: Amanda Kowalski (NBER) - A Nonlinear Budget Set Model of the Price Elasticity of Expenditure on Medical Care

Spring 2008
Departmental: Emmanuel Saez (Berkeley) - Optimal Minimum Wages in Competitive Labor Markets
IO: Panle Jia (MIT) - Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airlines Industry
IO: John Vickers (Oxford) - A Model of Delegated Project Choice
Organizational: Roland Benabou (Princeton) - Groupthink and Ideology
Organizational: Ali Hortacsu (Chicago) - Vertical Integration and Production: Some Plant-Level Evidence
Organizational: Enrico Perotti (Amsterdam) - Resistance to Change
Organizational: Gustavo Manso (MIT Sloan) - Incentives for Innovation: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Organizational: Mathias Dewatripont (Universite libre de Bruxelles) - 'Essential' Patents, FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards
Organizational: Christian Zehnder (HBS) - Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence
Organizational: Sylvain Chassang (Princeton) - Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts
Theory: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
Theory: Daron Acemoglu (MIT) - Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
Theory: In-Koo Cho (UIUC) - Perishable Durable Goods
Theory: Glenn Ellison (MIT) - Position Auctions with Consumer Search
Theory: Navin Kartik (UCSD) - Opinions as Incentives
Theory: Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton) - Measurable Ambiguity
Theory: Roger Myerson (Chicago) - Leadership, Trust, and Power
Labor: Edward Miguel (Berkeley) - The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
Hiring: Robert Johnson (Berkeley) - Trade and Prices with Heterogeneous Firms
Hiring: Joyee Deb (Kellogg) - Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names
Hiring: Kyna Fong (Stanford GSB) - Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons
Hiring: Ann Cecilia Fieler (NYU) - Non-Homotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative Explanation
Hiring: Yuval Salant (Stanford GSB) - Procedural Analysis of Choice Rules with Application to Bounded Rationality
LIDS Colloquium: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Stochastic Ficticious Play

Fall 2007
IO: Liran Einav (Stanford) - Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets
IO: Michael Grubb (MIT Sloan) - Selling to Overconfident Consumers
Operations Research: Matthew Jackson (Stanford) - Naive Learning on Social Networks
Organizational: Oliver Hart (Harvard) - Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points
Organizational: Richard Holden (MIT Sloan) - A Theory of Rule Development
Organizational: Robert Hall (Stanford) - The Incentives to Start New Companies: Evidence from Venture Capital
Organizational: Jean Tirole (Toulouse) - Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts
Organizational: Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton) - Leadership, Coordination, and Mission Driven Management
Theory: Attila Ambrus (Harvard) - Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks
Theory: Hyun Shin (Princeton) - Common Belief Foundatoins of Global Games
Theory: Muriel Niederle (Stanford) - Matching Through Decentralized Markets
Theory: Pierpaolo Battigalli (Bocconi) - Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
Public: Joseph Doyle (MIT Sloan) - Returns to Local-Area Health Care Spending: Using Health Shocks to Patients Far From Home

Spring 2007
Theory: Haluk Ergin (MIT) - Framing Contingencies
Theory: Leeat Yariv (CalTech) - Foundations for Bayesian Updating
Theory: Emre Ozdenoren (UMichigan) - Uncertainty and Compound Lotteries: Calibration
Theory: Jeff Zwiebel (Stanford GSB) - Endogenous Competitive Bargaining
Theory: Jonathan Weinstein (Kellogg MEDS) - Comparative Testing of Experts
Theory: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Theory: Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford GSB) - Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories
Theory: George-Marios Angeletos (MIT) - Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information
IO: Kenneth Hendricks (University of Texas at Austin) - Information and the Skewness of Music Sales
Hiring: Colin Stewart (Yale) - Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems
Hiring: Jonathan Vogel (Princeton) - Spatial Competition with Heterogeneous Firms
Hiring: Patrick Klein (University of Michigan) - Understanding Sectoral Labor Market Dynamics: An Equilibrium Analysis of the U.S. Oil and Gas Field Services Industry
Hiring: Emi Nakamura (Harvard) - Five Facts About Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models
Hiring: Satoru Takahashi (Harvard) - Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners Past Play
Hiring: Anna Mikusheva (Harvard) - Uniform Inferences in Autoregressive Models
Hiring: Ilyana Kuziemko (Harvard) - Going off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the Social Cost of Crime
Hiring: Parag Pathak (Harvard) - Tie Breaking in School Choice Problems

Fall 2006
Departmental: John List (Chicago) - The Economics of Open Air Markets
Theory: Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford GSB) - Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction
Theory: Aytek Erdil (HBS) - Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences
Theory: Susan Athey (Harvard) - Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations
Theory: Eduardo Faingold (Yale) - Building a Reputation Under Frequent Decisions
Theory: Markus Mobius (Harvard) - Trust and Social Collateral
Theory: Antoni Calvo-Armengol (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) - Investing in the Creation of Synergies: Building Socio-Economic Networks
Theory: Dilip Abreu (Princeton) - Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
IO: Jakub Kastl (Stanford) - Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions
IO: Fiona Scott Morton (Yale SOM) - State Casket Sales Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?
IO: Dominique Olie Lauga (MIT Grad. Student) - Persuasive Advertising with Sophisticated Impressionable Consumers
IO: Emek Basker (University of Missouri) - Putting a Smiley Face on the Dragon: Walmart as Catalyst to U.S.-China Trade
IO: Michael Noel (UCSD) - Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation
IO: Julio Rotemberg (HBS) - Fair Pricing
IO: Glenn Ellison (MIT) - Is Peer Review in Decline?
Public: Enrico Moretti (UC Berkeley) - Peers at Work
Public: Steve Levitt (Chicago) - The Margin Between Life and Death: Assessing Differences in Skill Across Emergency Room Doctors

At UCLA
Spring 2006
Theory: Charles Holt (UVA) - Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium

Winter 2006
IO: David Levine (UCLA) - Perfectly Competitive Innovation
Marschak: Daniel McFadden (Berkeley) - A New Science of Pleasure: Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of Well-Being
Recruitment: Carola Frydman (Harvard Grad. Student) - Rising Through the Ranks. The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936-2003
Recruitment: Ignacio Esponda (Stanford Grad. Student) - Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
Theory: Sushil Bikhchandani (UCLA Anderson) - Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Dominant Strategy Implementation
Theory: Joel Watson (UCSD) - Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade

Fall 2005
Asset Pricing: Alex Khatchaturian (UCLA Grad. Student) - Risk Aversion and the Markets
Econometrics: Victor Chernozhukov (MIT) - Quantile Regression under Misspecification, with an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure
Econometrics: Joris Pinkse (Penn State) - Heteroskedasticity Correction and Dimension Reduction
Macro: Pete Klenow (Stanford) - Real Rigidities and Nominal Price Changes
Theory: Ilan Kremer (Stanford) - On Regret and Options - A Game Theoretic Approach to Option Pricing
Theory: Johannes Horner (Northwestern) - The Wisdom of the Minority
Theory: Roger Myerson (Chicago) - Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights
Theory: Faruk Gul (Princeton) - The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences
Theory: Mariano Tappata (UCLA Grad. Student) - Rockets and Feathers: Understanding Asymmetric Pricing
Theory: Shachar Kariv (Berkeley) - Learning in Social Networks: Confronting Theory with Data and Vice Versa

Spring 2005
Applied: Manuela Angelucci (University of Arizona) - Aid and Migration: An Analysis of the Impact of Progressa on the Timing and Size of Labor Migration
Applied: Caroline Hoxby (Harvard) - The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achievement
Applied: Giovanni Peri (UC Davis) - Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from US Cities
Applied: Till von Wachter (Columbia) - Long-Term Effects from a Bad Start? An Analysis of College Graduates using Matched Employer-Employee Data
Applied: Thomas Macurdy (Stanford) - Projected Impacts of Alternative Reporting Plans on Participation and Costs of the Food Stamp Programs
Marschak: Simon Levin (Princeton) - Evolutionary Game Theory as Applied to Issues of Ecology
Marschak: Bernard Grofman (UC Irvine) - Of Course, They're Empirically Wrong, but Are They Usefully Wrong? A New Look at the Classics of Public Choice/Social Choice.
Monetary: Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln (Harvard) - Adjustment to a Large Shock: Do Households Smooth Low Frequency Consumption?
Theory: Balasz Szentes (Chicago) - Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition
Theory: Preston McAfee (CalTech) - Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry
Theory: John Morgan (Berkeley) - Clock Games: Theory and Experiment
Theory: Federico Echenique (CalTech) - Matching Problems by Monotone Methods
Theory: Uzi Segal (Boston College) - Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories
Theory: David Rahman (UCSD) - Team Formation and Organization
Theory: Lanier Benkard (Stanford) - Approximations for Analysis of Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Large Numbers of Heterogeneous Firms

Winter 2005
Applied: Limor Golan (Carnegie Mellon) - Experimentation and Job Choice
Applied: Abhijit Banerjee (MIT) - Long run impacts of income shocks: Wine and Phylloxera in 19th Century France
IO: Dirk Bergemann (Yale) - Robust Monopoly Pricing
IO: Yossi Feinberg (Stanford GSB) - Games with Incomplete Awareness
Marschak: David Levine (UCLA) - The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly
Monetary: Yuliy Sannikov (Berkeley) - Reputation Games in Continuous Time

Fall 2004
Asset Pricing: Enoch Cheng (UCLA Grad. Student) - Real Options and Applications
IO: Ilya Segal (Stanford) - The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets
IO: Matias Iaryczower (UCLA Grad. Student) - Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Congress
IO: Steve Tadelis (Stanford) - Employment versus Contracting in Procurement: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities
IO: Colin Camerer (CalTech) - Neural Foundation of Decisions and Games

Spring 2004
Econometrics: Robert Sherman (CalTech) - Identification and Estimation of Bounds on School Performance Measures: A Nonparametric Analysis of a Mixture Model with Verification
Econometrics: Allan Timmerman (UCSD) - Properties of Optimal Forecasts
Econometrics: Jerry Hausman (MIT) - Estimating duration Models with Heterogeneity and Time-Varying Regressors at the Regular Rate
Theory: Leeat Yariv (UCLA) - Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books
Theory: Ichiro Obara (UCLA) - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Fall 2003
Macro: Mark Bils (Rochester) - Measuring Growth from Better and Better Goods
Theory: Matthew Jackson (CalTech) - The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality