Pareto-Optimal

Workshops attended

At MIT/Harvard
Fall 2010
Organizational: John Van Reenen (LSE) - Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity
Organizational: Jean Tirole (Toulouse) - Laws and Norms
Organizational: Ernst Fehr (Zurich) - The Lure of Authority
Organizational: Samuel Lee (NYU Stern) - Authority Versus Loyalty: Social Incentives and Modes of Governance
Organizational: Rocco Macchiavello (Warwick) - The Value of Relational Contracts: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Flower Exports
Organizational: Joshua Gans (Melbourne) - Contracting Over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property Protection and Academic Publication
Organizational: Navin Kartik (Columbia) - Pandering to Persuade
Theory: Sylvain Chassang (Princeton) - Calibrated Incentive Contracts
Theory: Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern) - Dynamic Mechanism Design: Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
Macro: Emmanuel Farhi (Harvard) - Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle
Macro: Jenny Simon (MIT) - Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government
Macro: Fernando Duarte (MIT) - Inflation Risk and the Cross Section of Stock Returns
Macro: Luigi Iovino (MIT) - Liquidity Insurance with Market Information
Public: Tatyana Deryugina (MIT) - The Dynamic Effects of Hurricanes in the US: The Role of Non-Disaster Transfer Payments
Departmental: Matthew Jackson (Stanford) - Network Patterns of Favor Exchange
Job Market: Daniel Keniston (MIT) - Bargaining and Welfare: A Dynamic Structural Analysis of the Autorickshaw Market
Job Market: Mar Reguant (MIT) - Complex Bidding in Wholesale Electricity Markets
Job Market: Jonathan Goldberg (MIT) - A Liquidity Model of Deleveraging
Job Market: Marti Mestieri (MIT) - Wealth Distribution and Human Capital: How Can Borrowing Constraints Shape Schooling Systems?
Job Market: Glen Weyl (Harvard Society of Fellows) - Materialistic Genius and Market Power: Uncovering the Best Innovations
Job Market: Alex Wolitzky (MIT) - Reputational Bargaining under Knowledge of Rationality
Job Market: Michael Peters (MIT) - An Empirical Model of Misallocation: Financial Frictions and TFP in Indonesia
Job Market: Maya Eden (MIT) - Financial Distortions and the Distribution of Global Volatility
Job Market: Leila Agha (MIT) - Evaluating Health Information Technoogy: Impact on Hospital Organization, Medical Expenditures, and Health Outcomes
Job Market: Amanda Pallais (MIT) - Hiring and the Hold-Up Problem
Job Market: Jason Abaluck (MIT) - What Would We Eat if We Knew More: The Implications of a Large-Scale Change in Nutrition Labeling

Spring 2010
Organizational: Chad Syverson (Booth) - The Slow Growth of New Plants: Learning about Demand
Organizational: Chris Forman (Georgia Tech) - Vertical Integration and Information Technology Investment in the Insurance Industry
Organizational: John Graham (Fuqua) - Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms
Organizational: Daniel Elfenbein (Olin) - Exclusivity, Contingent Control Rights, and the Design of Internet Portal Alliances
Theory: Sandeep Baliga (MEDS) - Torture
IO: Mar Reguant-Rido (MIT) - Complex Bidding in Wholesale Electricity Markets
Hiring: Suresh Naidu (Berkeley) - Suffrage, Schooling, and Sorting in the Post-Bellum U.S. South
Hiring: Josh Schwartzstein (Harvard) - Selection Attention and Learning
Hiring: Michael Bauer (UCSD) - Term Premia and the News
Hiring: Heidi Williams (Harvard) - Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome
Hiring: Patrick Hummel (SGSB) - Policy Selection in Elections with Candidates of Heterogeneous Quality
Hiring: Juuso Toikka (Stanford) - A Folk Theorem for Markovian Private Information
Hiring: Benjamin Handel (Northwestern) - Adverse Selection and Switching Costs in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Hiring: Renato Gomes (Northwestern) - Mechanism Design in Two-Sided Markets: Auctioning Users

Fall 2009
Job Market: David Cesarini (MIT) - Genetic Variation in Financial Decision Making
Organizational: Gregor Matvos (Booth) - Renegotiation Design: Evidence from NFL Roster Bonuses
Organizational: Kristina McElheran (HBS) - Delegation in Multi-Divisional Firms: Determinants of the Organizational Structure of I.T. Purchasing Authority
Organizational: Wei Xiong (Princeton) - Dynamic Debt Runs
Organizational: Nicola Gennaioli (CREI) - Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress
Organizational: Birger Wernerfelt (Sloan) - Efficient Adaptation Versus Gains from Specialization
Organizational: Canice Prendergast (Chicago) - Contracts and Conflict in Organizations
Organizational: Mara Lederman (Toronto) - Contract Form and Technology Adoption in a Network Industry
Organizational: Dennis Yao (HBS) - Delay as Agenda Setting
Theory: Silvo Micali (MIT) - Robust Mechanism Design
Theory: Mehmet Ekmekci (Kellogg) - Reputation with Long Run Players
Theory: Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard) - Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Models of Ambiguity Aversion
Theory: Benny Moldavanu (Bonn) - Optimal Search, Learning, and Implementation
Theory: Glen Weyl (Harvard Society of Fellows) - A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms
Public: Nirupama Rao (MIT) - Taxes and the Extraction of Exhaustible Resources: Evidence from the 1980 Windfall Profit Tax
Public: Matthew Notowidigdo (MIT) - The Incidence of Local Labor Demand Shifts
Public: Jonathan Skinner (Dartmouth) - Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in US Health Care
Public: Benjamin Olken (MIT) - How to Target the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
IO: Glen Weyl (Harvard) - Pass-Through as an Economic Tool
IO: Aviv Nevo (Northwestern) - A Simple Model of Demand Anticipation
IO: Rob Porter (Northwestern) - Recent U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Bidding: A Progress Report
IO: Hunt Allcott (NYU) - Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox
Macro: Jean-Paul L'Huillier (MIT) - Consumers' Imperfect Information about Monetary Shocks and Nominal Rigidity
Macro: Dan Cao (MIT) - Collateral Constraint and Asset Price Volatility with Heterogeneous Expectations
International: Pol Antras (Harvard) - Intermediated Trade

Spring 2009
Organizational: Xavier Gabaix (NYU) - Detail Independent Contracting
Organizational: Oliver Hart (Harvard) - A Theory of Firm Scope
Organizational: Iwan Barankay (Wharton) - Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives for Teams: Evidence from Two Field Experiments
Organizational: Andrew Newman (BU) - Loopholes: Social Learning and the Evolution of Contract Form
Organizational: Christian Ruzzier (HBS) - Delegation of Authority in Oligopoly
Organizational: Ricard Gil (UCSC) - The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub] Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions
Organizational: Carola Frydman (MIT Sloan) - Does Military Experience Affect CEO Performance?
Organizational: Richard Holden (MIT Sloan) - No Firm is an Island: The Institutional Structure of Production in the Presence of the Price Mechanism
Organizational: Robert Scott (Columbia Law) - Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration
Theory: Sergiu Hart (Hebrew U) - An Operational Measure of Riskiness
Theory: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Perfect Public Ex-Post Equilibria of Repeated Games with Uncertain Outcomes
Theory: Daron Acemoglu (MIT) - Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs
Theory: Rani Spiegler (UCL) - Framing Competition
Theory: Philipp Sadowski (Duke) - Conditional Preferences for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior
Departmental: Jon Levin (Stanford) - An Analysis of Subprime Lending
Labor: Raj Chetty (Harvard) - Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Labor: Duncan Thomas (Duke) - Preferences: Survey and Experimental Evidence
Hiring: Marina Halac (Berkeley) - Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships
Hiring: Oleg Itskhoki (Harvard) - Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy
Hiring: Mihai Manea (Harvard) - Bargaining in Stationary Networks
Hiring: David Atkin (Princeton) - Trade, Tastes and Nutrition in India
Hiring: Dave Donaldson (LSE) - Railroads and the Raj: The Economic Impact of Transportation Infrastructure
Hiring: Guy Mayraz (LSE) - Priors and Desires - A Model of Payoff-Dependent Beliefs
Hiring: Georgy Egorov (Harvard) - Political Accountability under Special Interest Politics

Fall 2008
Organizational: Luis Garicano (LSE) - The Distinct Effects of Information Technologies and Communication Technologies on Firm Organization
Organizational: Julie Wulf (HBS) - The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization
Organizational: Antoinette Schoar (Sloan) - The Importance of Hold-Up in Contracting: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Organizational: Sudipto Bhattacharya (LSE) - Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes
Organizational: Ernst Fehr (Zurich) - Reputation and Contract Design
Organizational: Effi Benmelech (Harvard) - Vintage Capital and Creditor Protection
Organizational: Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton) - Learning in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
Organizational: Nick Bloom (Stanford) - The Organization of Firms across Countries
Organizational: Birger Wernerfelt (MIT Sloan) - Costs of Implementation: Bargaining Costs Versus Allocative Efficiency
Organizational: Andrei Shleifer (Harvard) - Regulation vs. Litigation
Theory: Peter Eso (Kellogg MEDS) - Wait and See: A Theory of Communication Over Time
Theory: Tayfun Sonmez (BC) - Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
Theory: Peyton Young (Oxford) - Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
Theory: Attila Ambrus (Harvard) - Delegation and Procedural Rules
Theory: Paul Milgrom (Stanford) - Assignment Exchanges
Theory: Michihiro Kandori (Tokyo) - Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
Theory: David Miller (UCSD) - Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies
IO: Stephen Ryan (MIT) - A Simple Nonparametric Estimator for the Distribution of Random Coefficients in Discrete Choice Models
Macro: John Geanakoplos (Yale) - Solving the Current Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle
Public: Amanda Kowalski (NBER) - A Nonlinear Budget Set Model of the Price Elasticity of Expenditure on Medical Care

Spring 2008
Departmental: Emmanuel Saez (Berkeley) - Optimal Minimum Wages in Competitive Labor Markets
IO: Panle Jia (MIT) - Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airlines Industry
IO: John Vickers (Oxford) - A Model of Delegated Project Choice
Organizational: Roland Benabou (Princeton) - Groupthink and Ideology
Organizational: Ali Hortacsu (Chicago) - Vertical Integration and Production: Some Plant-Level Evidence
Organizational: Enrico Perotti (Amsterdam) - Resistance to Change
Organizational: Gustavo Manso (MIT Sloan) - Incentives for Innovation: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Organizational: Mathias Dewatripont (Universite libre de Bruxelles) - 'Essential' Patents, FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards
Organizational: Christian Zehnder (HBS) - Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence
Organizational: Sylvain Chassang (Princeton) - Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts
Theory: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
Theory: Daron Acemoglu (MIT) - Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
Theory: In-Koo Cho (UIUC) - Perishable Durable Goods
Theory: Glenn Ellison (MIT) - Position Auctions with Consumer Search
Theory: Navin Kartik (UCSD) - Opinions as Incentives
Theory: Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton) - Measurable Ambiguity
Theory: Roger Myerson (Chicago) - Leadership, Trust, and Power
Labor: Edward Miguel (Berkeley) - The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
Hiring: Robert Johnson (Berkeley) - Trade and Prices with Heterogeneous Firms
Hiring: Joyee Deb (Kellogg) - Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names
Hiring: Kyna Fong (Stanford GSB) - Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons
Hiring: Ann Cecilia Fieler (NYU) - Non-Homotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative Explanation
Hiring: Yuval Salant (Stanford GSB) - Procedural Analysis of Choice Rules with Application to Bounded Rationality
LIDS Colloquium: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Stochastic Ficticious Play

Fall 2007
IO: Liran Einav (Stanford) - Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets
IO: Michael Grubb (MIT Sloan) - Selling to Overconfident Consumers
Operations Research: Matthew Jackson (Stanford) - Naive Learning on Social Networks
Organizational: Oliver Hart (Harvard) - Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points
Organizational: Richard Holden (MIT Sloan) - A Theory of Rule Development
Organizational: Robert Hall (Stanford) - The Incentives to Start New Companies: Evidence from Venture Capital
Organizational: Jean Tirole (Toulouse) - Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts
Organizational: Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton) - Leadership, Coordination, and Mission Driven Management
Theory: Attila Ambrus (Harvard) - Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks
Theory: Hyun Shin (Princeton) - Common Belief Foundatoins of Global Games
Theory: Muriel Niederle (Stanford) - Matching Through Decentralized Markets
Theory: Pierpaolo Battigalli (Bocconi) - Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
Public: Joseph Doyle (MIT Sloan) - Returns to Local-Area Health Care Spending: Using Health Shocks to Patients Far From Home

Spring 2007
Theory: Haluk Ergin (MIT) - Framing Contingencies
Theory: Leeat Yariv (CalTech) - Foundations for Bayesian Updating
Theory: Emre Ozdenoren (UMichigan) - Uncertainty and Compound Lotteries: Calibration
Theory: Jeff Zwiebel (Stanford GSB) - Endogenous Competitive Bargaining
Theory: Jonathan Weinstein (Kellogg MEDS) - Comparative Testing of Experts
Theory: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard) - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Theory: Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford GSB) - Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories
Theory: George-Marios Angeletos (MIT) - Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information
IO: Kenneth Hendricks (University of Texas at Austin) - Information and the Skewness of Music Sales
Hiring: Colin Stewart (Yale) - Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems
Hiring: Jonathan Vogel (Princeton) - Spatial Competition with Heterogeneous Firms
Hiring: Patrick Klein (University of Michigan) - Understanding Sectoral Labor Market Dynamics: An Equilibrium Analysis of the U.S. Oil and Gas Field Services Industry
Hiring: Emi Nakamura (Harvard) - Five Facts About Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models
Hiring: Satoru Takahashi (Harvard) - Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners Past Play
Hiring: Anna Mikusheva (Harvard) - Uniform Inferences in Autoregressive Models
Hiring: Ilyana Kuziemko (Harvard) - Going off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the Social Cost of Crime
Hiring: Parag Pathak (Harvard) - Tie Breaking in School Choice Problems

Fall 2006
Departmental: John List (Chicago) - The Economics of Open Air Markets
Theory: Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford GSB) - Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction
Theory: Aytek Erdil (HBS) - Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences
Theory: Susan Athey (Harvard) - Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations
Theory: Eduardo Faingold (Yale) - Building a Reputation Under Frequent Decisions
Theory: Markus Mobius (Harvard) - Trust and Social Collateral
Theory: Antoni Calvo-Armengol (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) - Investing in the Creation of Synergies: Building Socio-Economic Networks
Theory: Dilip Abreu (Princeton) - Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
IO: Jakub Kastl (Stanford) - Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions
IO: Fiona Scott Morton (Yale SOM) - State Casket Sales Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?
IO: Dominique Olie Lauga (MIT Grad. Student) - Persuasive Advertising with Sophisticated Impressionable Consumers
IO: Emek Basker (University of Missouri) - Putting a Smiley Face on the Dragon: Walmart as Catalyst to U.S.-China Trade
IO: Michael Noel (UCSD) - Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation
IO: Julio Rotemberg (HBS) - Fair Pricing
IO: Glenn Ellison (MIT) - Is Peer Review in Decline?
Public: Enrico Moretti (UC Berkeley) - Peers at Work
Public: Steve Levitt (Chicago) - The Margin Between Life and Death: Assessing Differences in Skill Across Emergency Room Doctors

At UCLA
Spring 2006
Theory: Charles Holt (UVA) - Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium

Winter 2006
IO: David Levine (UCLA) - Perfectly Competitive Innovation
Marschak: Daniel McFadden (Berkeley) - A New Science of Pleasure: Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of Well-Being
Recruitment: Carola Frydman (Harvard Grad. Student) - Rising Through the Ranks. The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936-2003
Recruitment: Ignacio Esponda (Stanford Grad. Student) - Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
Theory: Sushil Bikhchandani (UCLA Anderson) - Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Dominant Strategy Implementation
Theory: Joel Watson (UCSD) - Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade

Fall 2005
Asset Pricing: Alex Khatchaturian (UCLA Grad. Student) - Risk Aversion and the Markets
Econometrics: Victor Chernozhukov (MIT) - Quantile Regression under Misspecification, with an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure
Econometrics: Joris Pinkse (Penn State) - Heteroskedasticity Correction and Dimension Reduction
Macro: Pete Klenow (Stanford) - Real Rigidities and Nominal Price Changes
Theory: Ilan Kremer (Stanford) - On Regret and Options - A Game Theoretic Approach to Option Pricing
Theory: Johannes Horner (Northwestern) - The Wisdom of the Minority
Theory: Roger Myerson (Chicago) - Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights
Theory: Faruk Gul (Princeton) - The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences
Theory: Mariano Tappata (UCLA Grad. Student) - Rockets and Feathers: Understanding Asymmetric Pricing
Theory: Shachar Kariv (Berkeley) - Learning in Social Networks: Confronting Theory with Data and Vice Versa

Spring 2005
Applied: Manuela Angelucci (University of Arizona) - Aid and Migration: An Analysis of the Impact of Progressa on the Timing and Size of Labor Migration
Applied: Caroline Hoxby (Harvard) - The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achievement
Applied: Giovanni Peri (UC Davis) - Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from US Cities
Applied: Till von Wachter (Columbia) - Long-Term Effects from a Bad Start? An Analysis of College Graduates using Matched Employer-Employee Data
Applied: Thomas Macurdy (Stanford) - Projected Impacts of Alternative Reporting Plans on Participation and Costs of the Food Stamp Programs
Marschak: Simon Levin (Princeton) - Evolutionary Game Theory as Applied to Issues of Ecology
Marschak: Bernard Grofman (UC Irvine) - Of Course, They're Empirically Wrong, but Are They Usefully Wrong? A New Look at the Classics of Public Choice/Social Choice.
Monetary: Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln (Harvard) - Adjustment to a Large Shock: Do Households Smooth Low Frequency Consumption?
Theory: Balasz Szentes (Chicago) - Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition
Theory: Preston McAfee (CalTech) - Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry
Theory: John Morgan (Berkeley) - Clock Games: Theory and Experiment
Theory: Federico Echenique (CalTech) - Matching Problems by Monotone Methods
Theory: Uzi Segal (Boston College) - Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories
Theory: David Rahman (UCSD) - Team Formation and Organization
Theory: Lanier Benkard (Stanford) - Approximations for Analysis of Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Large Numbers of Heterogeneous Firms

Winter 2005
Applied: Limor Golan (Carnegie Mellon) - Experimentation and Job Choice
Applied: Abhijit Banerjee (MIT) - Long run impacts of income shocks: Wine and Phylloxera in 19th Century France
IO: Dirk Bergemann (Yale) - Robust Monopoly Pricing
IO: Yossi Feinberg (Stanford GSB) - Games with Incomplete Awareness
Marschak: David Levine (UCLA) - The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly
Monetary: Yuliy Sannikov (Berkeley) - Reputation Games in Continuous Time

Fall 2004
Asset Pricing: Enoch Cheng (UCLA Grad. Student) - Real Options and Applications
IO: Ilya Segal (Stanford) - The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets
IO: Matias Iaryczower (UCLA Grad. Student) - Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Congress
IO: Steve Tadelis (Stanford) - Employment versus Contracting in Procurement: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities
IO: Colin Camerer (CalTech) - Neural Foundation of Decisions and Games

Spring 2004
Econometrics: Robert Sherman (CalTech) - Identification and Estimation of Bounds on School Performance Measures: A Nonparametric Analysis of a Mixture Model with Verification
Econometrics: Allan Timmerman (UCSD) - Properties of Optimal Forecasts
Econometrics: Jerry Hausman (MIT) - Estimating duration Models with Heterogeneity and Time-Varying Regressors at the Regular Rate
Theory: Leeat Yariv (UCLA) - Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books
Theory: Ichiro Obara (UCLA) - The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Fall 2003
Macro: Mark Bils (Rochester) - Measuring Growth from Better and Better Goods
Theory: Matthew Jackson (CalTech) - The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality