

## Midterm

- Will go through section on "Price Caps and Related Regimes" (up to section 4e)
- One question on Laffont-Tirole (2 types)
- Vertical restraints
- There will be choice

## Ratchet effects

Know general conclusions

## Articles

Know economic rationale for resale price maintenance

- minimum price  $\Rightarrow$  encourage service by giving extra surplus to the retailers
- rules out going to one retailer, learning about product, going elsewhere and buying it
- minimum price  $\Rightarrow$  stores compete on service quality, not prices

Vertical restraints more broadly:

- exclusive territories
- franchise fees
- tying

Rationales:

- double marginalization
- RPM and franchise fees can correct when there is known demand.
- With uncertainty, they will need to share the risk.

Input substitution argument

- you are upstream provider of one input and are a monopolist. Other input is supplied competitively.
- upstream supplier forces downstream firm to buy both inputs from him

(\*) Read Ordoover-Salop-Saloner

$$\max D(p,s) (p - p_w - \psi(s))$$

downstream firm's profit

FOC:

$$(s): D_s(p,s)(p - p_w - \psi(s)) - \psi'(s)D(p,s) = 0$$

If  $p_w \neq c$ , then there will be some distortions in terms of choice of service

Mergers

- Know the relative costs/benefits of using AIDS, BLP, etc.

## Regulation of Natural Monopoly

- First best pricing (if know all private info)
- Ramsey pricing - second best
- Implementation through price cap
- Incentive regulation
  - informational requirements
  - menu provision
  - ratcheting effects.

Yardstick competition

Regulatory lags

Regulation can be a cheaper way of doing  
income redistribution