

I Supermodularity vs. single crossing

II Some facts about lattices and supermodular functions

III Milgrom Roberts (1990)

IV Adapting this logic

I Single crossing

• complementarities across actions

$$x^*(t) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S(t)} f(x, t), \quad t \geq t', \quad S(t) \geq S(t') \Rightarrow x^*(t) \geq x^*(t')$$

if f is supermodular

Note: f supermodular $\not\Rightarrow g(f)$, g increasing is supermodular, even though g is strictly increasing.

$$\frac{\partial^2 g(f(x, y))}{\partial x \partial y} = \underbrace{g'}_{\geq 0} \underbrace{\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x \partial y}}_{\geq 0} + \underbrace{g''}_{?} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \frac{\partial f}{\partial y}$$

However, if this theorem holds for f , it holds for $g \circ f$, since if

$$x_f^*(t) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S(t)} f(x, t), \quad \text{then}$$

$$x_{f \circ g}^*(t) = x_f^*(t)$$

- Single-crossing; ordinal theory of complementarities
- Milgrom-Shannon, Econometrica

E.g. 2 players:


- player 1: $a_1 \in \{0, 1\}$

- player 2: $a_2 \in [0, 1]$

- $\pi_1(1, a_2) - \pi_1(0, a_2) \equiv \Delta(a_2)$


= value of investment for player 1

- complementarities: "I take a higher action when you take a higher action"
- supermodularity: $\Delta(\cdot)$ is increasing



- single-crossing: $\Delta(0)$ has exactly one sol'n.

- much weaker condition.



II Some facts on lattices and supermodular functions

1] A finite lattice has a highest and a smallest element

◦ (A, \geq) , \geq a partial order

◦ a_0 . If $\exists a$ s.t. $a_0 \neq a$, let $a_1 = a \vee a_0$. Can proceed until all elements are exhausted.

2] Closed sublattices of complete lattices are complete.

◦ (A, \geq) is complete if any subset has an inf and a sup in A .

3] If (A, \geq) is complete, then $A = [x^L(A), x^H(A)]$, where $x^L(A)$ is the lowest element and $x^H(A)$ is the largest element.

◦ i.e. we can "summarize" a lattice by its extremal elements

4] What does $S \geq S'$ mean in terms of $x^H(S)$ and $x^H(S')$?

◦ If $S \geq S'$, then $x^H(S) \geq x^H(S')$ and $x^L(S) \geq x^L(S')$

Pf. $S \geq S' \Rightarrow x^H(S) \vee x^H(S') \in S \Rightarrow$

$x^H(S) \geq x^H(S) \vee x^H(S') \geq x^H(S') \quad \square$

Jopke's Thm: Let $f: \mathbb{X} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be supermodular in x (since $t \in \mathbb{R}$, this is equivalent to increasing differences in t and x). Let

$$x^*(t) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in S(t)} f(x, t)$$

Then if $t \geq t'$ and $S(t) \supseteq S(t')$, then $x^*(t) \geq x^*(t')$

Pf: We want to show that if $x \in x^*(t)$ and $x' \in x^*(t')$, then $x \vee x' \in x^*(t)$. We want $x \vee x'$ maximizing $f(x, t)$ over $S(t)$.

$$\boxed{1} \quad S(t) \supseteq S(t') \Rightarrow x \vee x' \in S(t)$$

$\boxed{2}$ Since x maximizes f at t ,

$$f(x, t) \geq f(x \vee x', t) \quad (1)$$

Since x' maximizes f at t' ,

$$f(x', t') \geq f(x \wedge x', t') \quad (2), \text{ since } x \wedge x' \in S(t')$$

$$\Rightarrow f(x \vee x', t) - f(x, t) \leq 0$$

$$\text{and } 0 \leq f(x', t') - f(x \wedge x', t')$$

\Rightarrow By increasing differences in t , we have

$$0 \geq f(x \vee x', t) - f(x, t) \geq f(x \vee x', t) - f(x, t')$$

$$\Rightarrow f(x \vee x', t') - f(x, t') \leq f(x', t') - f(x \wedge x', t') \quad (3)$$

If this inequality is strict, this contradicts f supermodular in x at t' .

Thus, $f(x, t) = f(x \vee x', t) \Rightarrow x \vee x'$ maximizes f at t over $S(t)$.

How do you apply this to game theory?

Supermodularity \Rightarrow monotone best reply

• i.e. $(A_1, \geq_1), (A_2, \geq_2)$. If have monotone BR,

then if $a_i \leq a_i'$, then $BR_{-i}(a_i) \leq_{-i} BR_{-i}(a_i')$

\Rightarrow extreme Nash equilibria (exists a highest and lowest NE) and a nice way to compute them.

Milgrom-Roberts

Define $x_i^*(s_{-i}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{s_i \in S_i} \overbrace{u_i(s_i, s_{-i})}^{cf f(x, t)}$

If u_i is supermodular in s_i and increasing differences in s_{-i} , apply Topkis and have $x_i^*(s_{-i})$ is increasing in s_{-i} .

Note if u_i continuous in s_i , then $x_i^*(s_{-i})$ has a max and a min.

Since S_i is complete, $x_i^*(s_{-i})$ has a sup.

Since u_i is continuous, $x_i^*(s_{-i})$ is closed.

$$\Rightarrow \sup x_i^*(s_{-i}) \in x_i^*(s_{-i})$$

$$\text{Define } BR_i^h(s_{-i}) = \max x_i^*(s_{-i})$$

$$BR_i^l(s_{-i}) = \min x_i^*(s_{-i})$$

By Topkis, $BR_i^h(s_{-i})$ and $BR_i^l(s_{-i})$ are increasing.

$$\text{Let } S_i = [x_i, \bar{x}_i]$$

$$\Rightarrow \Omega \subset [x, \bar{x}], \text{ where } x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ \bar{x} = (\bar{x}_1, \dots, \bar{x}_n)$$

By monotone BR, we have:

$$BR(\Omega) \subset BR([x, \bar{x}])$$

$$\stackrel{\text{monotone BR}}{\subset} [BR^l(x), BR^h(\bar{x})] \subset \Omega$$

monotone BR

$$\text{Then } x \in BR^l(x)$$

$$\Rightarrow BR^l(x) \in \underbrace{BR^l(BR^l(x))}_{= (BR^l)^2(x)} \in \dots \in (BR^l)^k(x) \in \dots$$

$$BR^k(\Omega) \subset [(BR^l)^k(x), (BR^h)^k(\bar{x})]$$

$$(BR^l)^k(x) \rightarrow x^\infty, (BR^h)^k(\bar{x}) \rightarrow \bar{x}^\infty \text{ with } x^\infty, \bar{x}^\infty \text{ Nash.}$$

$$\text{and } BR^\infty(\Omega) \subset [x^\infty, \bar{x}^\infty] \text{ if } u_i \text{ continuous.}$$