

Suppose, by way of contradiction that, as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$,

$$\sigma_B' \rightarrow 0 \text{ and } \sigma_B'' \rightarrow 0;$$

$$(\sigma_B', \sigma_B'') \rightarrow (0, 0) \Rightarrow v(c | \theta_s = \theta_s', L) = \delta(\epsilon) \cdot [\alpha(\epsilon)(-4) + (1-\alpha(\epsilon))15] + (1-\delta(\epsilon))[(1-p)(-4) + 15p]$$

where $\delta(\epsilon) = \Pr[\theta_B = \theta_B' | \theta_s = \theta_s', L]$

$$= \frac{\sigma_B' (p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2)}{[p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2]\sigma_B' + \epsilon(1-\epsilon)(1-\sigma_B'')}$$

$$\text{and } \alpha(\epsilon) = \Pr[v=10 | \theta_B', \theta_s'] = 1 - \frac{p(1-\epsilon)^2}{p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2}$$

Assume $\delta(\epsilon) \rightarrow 0$ as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$

and $\alpha(\epsilon) \rightarrow 0$ as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$

$$\Rightarrow v(c | \theta_s = \theta_s', L) \rightarrow (1-p)(-4) + 15p$$

Recall: $v_s(D | \theta_s = \theta_s', L) = 10$

$\Rightarrow D$ is optimal for s for proper parametrization

Then, $(\sigma_s', \sigma_s'') \rightarrow (1, 0)$ as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$

$$v_B(H | \theta_B = \theta_B') \approx \pi(\epsilon) [\beta(\epsilon)14 + (1-\beta(\epsilon))10] + (1-\pi(\epsilon)) [p(14) + (1-p)10] - 14$$

$$v_B(L | \theta_B = \theta_B') \approx \pi(\epsilon) [\beta(\epsilon)14 + (1-\beta(\epsilon))10] + (1-\pi(\epsilon)) [p(14) + (1-p)10] - 10$$

$$\pi(\epsilon) = \frac{p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2}{p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2 + \epsilon(1-\epsilon)} \quad \beta(\epsilon) = \frac{p(1-\epsilon)^2}{p(1-\epsilon)^2 + (1-p)\epsilon^2}$$

Thus, $v_B(H|O_B = O_B') < v_B(L|O_B = O_B') \Rightarrow$ ~~---~~

$$Pr[V=14] = \beta_i$$

$$FB: \max_i \{ \beta_i 14 + (1-\beta_i) 10 - c(i) \}$$

$$c(i): c'(i) = 4\beta$$

$$\text{Seller: } \max_i \{ [\beta_i (1 - Pr[L|V=\underline{v}]) + (1-\beta_i) Pr[H|V=\underline{v}]] 14 \\ + [(1-\beta_i)(1 - Pr[H|V=\underline{v}]) + \beta_i Pr[L|V=\underline{v}]] 10 \\ - c(i) \}$$

$$c(i): 4\beta (1 - Pr[L|V=\underline{v}] - Pr[H|V=\underline{v}]) = c'(i)$$

Need $Pr[L|V=\underline{v}] + Pr[H|V=\underline{v}] = 0$, but this is impossible.

References:
 Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (EMA 1994) "ADR"

Segal (1995, 1999) - Job market paper

Hart-Moore (1999)

Che-Mausch (AER 1999)

Nöldeke-Schmidt (RAND 1996)

• Segal - complexity might justify incomplete contracts.

• Nöldeke-Schmidt: can get FB with options contract

• ADR - with proper "default," can make both

players the residual claimant

Read chapter 12's introduction and literature section.

Contract theory is sort of like game theory with endogenous rules.

- Nice toolkit to take on a lot of applied topics.

Next Wednesday - Future research

Exam: 3 sections

- 1] 5 or 6 True/False/Uncertain-type questions
- 2] Two problems out of three.