

14.271: Industrial Organization I

Notes on Screening with a Continuum of Types

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1 Screening with a Continuum of Types

Consider a model of second-degree price discrimination in which there are a continuum of types. That is, suppose consumers have preferences given by $V(q, \theta) - T(q)$ if they buy q units of a good and pay $T(q)$ dollars for it. Suppose θ is distributed with cdf $F(\theta)$ defined on $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$.

The monopolist wants to choose $T(q(\cdot))$ and $q(\cdot)$ to

$$\max_{T(q(\cdot)), q(\cdot)} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} [T(q(\theta)) - cq(\theta)] f(\theta) d\theta$$

subject to

$$V(q(\theta), \theta) - T(q(\theta)) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \quad (\text{IR})$$

$$\theta = \operatorname{argmax}_{\tilde{\theta}} V(q(\tilde{\theta}), \theta) - T(q(\tilde{\theta})) \quad (\text{IC})$$

Define the value function

$$U(\theta) = \max_{\tilde{\theta}} V(q(\tilde{\theta}), \theta) - T(q(\tilde{\theta})).$$

Then, by the envelope theorem, we have

$$\frac{\partial U(\theta)}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}.$$

Thus, since

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial U(x)}{\partial \theta} dx \\ &= U(\theta) - U(\underline{\theta}), \end{aligned}$$

by the fundamental theorem of calculus. We will necessarily want that $U(\underline{\theta}) = V(q(\underline{\theta}), \underline{\theta}) - T(q(\underline{\theta})) = 0$, since otherwise, the monopolist could increase $T(q(\underline{\theta}))$ and increase its profits without affecting the IR of the lowest type. Thus,

$$U(\theta) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} d\theta,$$

and we have by definition

$$\begin{aligned} T(q(\theta)) &= V(q(\theta), \theta) - U(\theta) \\ &= V(q(\theta), \theta) - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} d\theta. \end{aligned}$$

The monopolist's objective function then becomes

$$\begin{aligned} &\max_{q(\cdot)} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[V(q(\theta), \theta) - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx - cq(\theta) \right] f(\theta) d\theta \\ &= \max_{q(\cdot)} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} [V(q(\theta), \theta) - cq(\theta)] f(\theta) d\theta - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx f(\theta) d\theta. \end{aligned}$$

Using integration by parts, we can write the second term as

$$\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [-f(\theta) d\theta].$$

Let $u = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx$ and $dv = -f(\theta) d\theta$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} du &= \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} d\theta \\ v &= 1 - F(\theta), \end{aligned}$$

so

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [-f(\theta) d\theta] &= \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [1 - F(\theta)] \Big|_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} [1 - F(\theta)] \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} d\theta \\ &= - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} f(\theta) d\theta, \end{aligned}$$

since

$$\begin{aligned} \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\theta} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [1 - F(\theta)] \Big|_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} &= \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [1 - F(\bar{\theta})] \\ &\quad - \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\underline{\theta}} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] [1 - F(\underline{\theta})] \\ &= \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial V(q(x), x)}{\partial \theta} dx \right] \cdot 0 - 0 \cdot 1 = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we can write our objective function as

$$\max_{q(\cdot)} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[V(q(\theta), \theta) - cq(\theta) - \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} \right] f(\theta) d\theta.$$

We can then take our FOCs point by point

$$(q(\theta)) : \frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial q(\theta)} - c - \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} = 0,$$

or

$$\frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial q(\theta)} = c + \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta}.$$

By assumption, $\frac{\partial^2 V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} > 0$, so we have that

$$\frac{\partial V(q(\theta), \theta)}{\partial q(\theta)} > c,$$

and thus $q(\theta) < q^{FB}(\theta)$ for each θ , except $\bar{\theta}$, where

$$\frac{\partial v(q(\bar{\theta}), \bar{\theta})}{\partial q(\bar{\theta})} = c + \underbrace{\frac{1 - F(\bar{\theta})}{f(\bar{\theta})} \frac{\partial^2 V(q(\bar{\theta}), \bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}}_{=0} = c,$$

giving us $q(\bar{\theta}) = q^{FB}(\bar{\theta})$, which is the standard "no distortion at the top" result of adverse selection models.